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Abstract
We document the existence of a gubernatorial election cycle in state executions,
suggesting that election year political considerations play a role in determining the timing of
executions. Our analysis indicates that states are approximately 25 percent more likely to
conduct executions in gubernatorial election years than in other years. We also find that elections
have a larger effect on the probability that an African American defendant will be executed in a
given year than on the probability that a white defendant will be executed, and that the overall
effect of elections is largest in the South. These findings raise concerns that state executions may
fail to meet the constitutional requirements stipulated by the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia
for the administration of state death penalty laws.

1. Introduction
The rapid increase over the past decade in both the number of executions conducted
nationally and the number of states that utilize capital punishment has renewed interest in the
policy ramifications of death penalty laws and their application. Figure 1 shows the trend in the
number of executions by year from 1977 to 2000. In the period from 1976, when the death
penalty was again ruled constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976), until the early 1990s there was a gradual increase in the number of
executions performed by state governments. However, beginning in the early 1990s, the pace at
which states have been executing defendants has accelerated rapidly, from approximately 20
executions per year in the early 1990s to a high of roughly 100 in 1999.
There have also been significant increases over this period in the number of states that
have reinstated the death penalty and the percentage of death penalty states that have conducted
executions. Figure 2 shows the trend in the number of states that have a death penalty over the
sample period. At the beginning of the sample, only 28 states had a death penalty, but over the
last twenty years, ten more states have added death penalty laws. As the number of states with
the death penalty has increased, the percentage of these states that execute a defendant in a given
year has also increased. Figure 3 shows the trends in the percentage of states that use the death
penalty over time. Over the last four years of the sample, almost one-half of states with a death
penalty used it in any given year.
These trends, although informative about what has occurred nationally, mask sizeable
differences in the frequency with which states conduct executions. Table 1 presents the average
number of executions performed in each death penalty state for the years that the death penalty
was in effect. The majority of death penalty states average less than one execution per year,
indicating that executions are rare events in most states. However, there are several states that
conduct executions with considerable regularity, including Texas (with approximately ten

executions per year), Virginia (three executions per year), Florida (two executions per year), and
Missouri (two executions per year).
In the absence of any consensus on the deterrent effects of capital punishment (see
Ehrlich 1975, 1977; Grogger 1990; and Ehrlich and Liu 1999), the focus of recent policy debates
has shifted to the possible arbitrary application of the death penalty and the associated
implications for defendants’ due process rights.1 This focus is consistent with the conditions set
forth by the United State Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia, where the Court ruled that states
could again impose the death penalty provided that its application was neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory. In evaluating whether current state practices meet these criteria, policymakers
have for the most part focused on racial and other disparities observed at the sentencing stage of
the process, with considerably less attention being paid to possible irregularities existing at the
time of execution.
In this paper, we conduct an analysis of the impact of gubernatorial elections on state
executions.2 We find that the presence of a gubernatorial election increases the probability of a
state execution by approximately 25 percent. We also find that elections have a larger effect on
the probability that an African American defendant will be executed in a given year than on the
probability that a white defendant will be executed, and that the overall effect of elections is
largest in the South. Interestingly, the effect of elections is attenuated by the presence of
gubernatorial term limits, which presumably weaken the incentives to manipulate the timing of
executions for political gain. Although not definitive, we also present some evidence that the
cyclical effects we identify lead to reductions in the amount of time that executed defendants
spend on death row.3
These results suggest that concerns about legal due process should not be restricted to the
sentencing phase, but should also extend to the manner in which defendants are selected for
execution. The issue of how gubernatorial discretion is exercised in capital cases has taken on
2

increased importance over time as the availability of post-conviction judicial review has been
increasingly limited at both the state and federal levels (Langbein 1999; Pridemore 2000). More
generally, our findings raise questions about the extent to which states are in compliance with the
constitutional requirements for executions set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Gregg
v. Georgia.
Other recent work has also been concerned about the possibility that political and other
extra-legal factors may be playing a role in both the sentencing and punishment phases of capital
cases. Culver (1999) documents the widespread politicization of the death penalty at the state
level and the sometimes intense political pressure that is brought to bear on elected officials who
oppose capital punishment. A well-known example is the removal of Rose Bird and two of her
colleagues from the California Supreme Court, the first time in the state’s history that appellate
judges were removed from office. In a similar case, Penny White, a Tennessee Supreme Court
justice, was the first appellate judge in Tennessee to lose a retention election, primarily due to
her support for a controversial decision that overturned a death sentence in a high-profile murder
case.
Culver also discusses the apparent political pressures that capital cases create for
governors. Examples include New Mexico’s Toney Anaya (D: 1983-1986), who in his last
months in office commuted the death sentences of all five men on New Mexico’s death row, and
Ohio governor Richard Celeste (D: 1983 to 1991), who commuted the death sentences of seven
death row prisoners just four days before leaving office. The timing of executive decisions in
these examples suggests that political considerations have played a role in the disposition of
capital cases.
Another study, by Langbein (1999), examines whether the same racial and political
factors that appear to play a role in determining which defendants receive the death penalty carry
over to the decision to perform an execution. Using data on a panel of death penalty states from
3

1977 to 1992, she finds that the number of executions performed in a state are significantly
related to measures of black political power and the adoption by states of restrictions on the postconviction legal options of defendants. She also finds some evidence that the race and gender of
victims plays a role, as does the severity of the crime.
Finally, a recent study by Pridemore (2000) examines the determinants of governors’
commutation decisions. Using data on 4800 persons sentenced to death in the United States
between 1974 and 1995, he finds that the number of commutations per execution in a state
declines in gubernatorial election years compared to other years. Although Pridemore’s finding
of a gubernatorial election cycle in commutation decisions relative to executions is suggestive of
the type of political influence that we seek to quantify, our analysis differs from his in several
important ways. First, although his study is based on a relatively long panel of data, he does not
control for either national trends in executions or state-specific differences in the propensity to
execute. Second, given that Pridemore only examines how the number of commutations relative
to the number of executions varies over the electoral cycle, his work cannot determine whether
this cycle is being driven by changes in commutation behavior, changes in execution behavior, or
both.4 Our work disentangles these effects. Finally, we examine other (related) outcomes that
may be influenced by elections, such as differential effects of elections by race, region, and party
affiliation of the governor, the impact of term limits, and the effect of elections on the amount of
time that prisoners spend on death row.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data. In Section 3, we
discuss our empirical methodology and present our main findings. Section 4 presents some
additional evidence supporting the existence of an election cycle in state executions. Section 5
explores, to the extent possible, how the election effect we document affects the amount of time
defendants spend on death row before they are executed. Concluding remarks are offered in
Section 6.
4

2. Data
The execution data come from two sources. The first is a panel of the United States, with
yearly observations running from 1977 to 2000. Information on the annual number of executions
in a state is taken from publications of the Death Penalty Information Center, and tabulations on
the race of defendants executed by states are obtained from the publication “Death Row, U.S.A.”
(NAACP Legal Defense Fund 2001).
States are excluded from the sample if they had no death penalty at any time between
1977 and 2000. States that instituted a death penalty during the sample period are included in the
data set beginning the year after the death penalty was reinstated.5 Table 1 lists the states that
reinstated the death penalty, the year of the reinstatement and the average number of people who
have been executed per year by each state in the years after the death penalty was reinstated.
Summary statistics of this panel of states are presented in Table 2. In about one quarter of
the state/year cells in the sample, there is at least one execution; on average, there are about 0.8
executions per year in a state with the death penalty. About 55 percent of these executions are of
white defendants, and about 36 percent are African-Americans.
We also have information on all persons sentenced to death since 1972 from the Bureau
of Justice Statistics publication, Capital Punishment in the United States: 1973-1999. This data
set contains information on the demographic characteristics of death row inmates, their criminal
backgrounds, and the amount of time that each spent on death row. For each year that a state has
at least one execution between 1977 and 1999, we calculate the average time on death row for
the defendants executed that year.6 On average, the wait on death row is slightly less than 10
years.
Data on the timing of gubernatorial elections is taken from The Book of the States
(Council of State Governments 2001). Election cycles vary across states for several reasons.
First, some states have gubernatorial elections every two years while most states have elections
5

every four years. Also, most states schedule their elections on even calendar years, but there is a
significant minority of states that hold elections in odd years. Finally, among states with a fouryear election cycle during even years, some hold elections in presidential election years while
others have elections at the midpoint of presidential terms. There is a similar staggering for states
with four-year cycles that hold elections in odd years.

3. Election Cycles in State Executions
To measure the effect of gubernatorial elections on executions, we begin by estimating a
probit model of the form:
Pr (Execution i ,t ) = Φ (α + βElection Indicator i ,t +ϕ t +γ i+η i ,t )

(1)

where i indexes states and t indexes time. Execution i ,t is an indicator that state i had at least one
execution in year t; Election Indicator i ,t is an indicator that state i had a gubernatorial election in
year t. ϕ t is a full set of year effects; γ i is a full set of state effects, and η i ,t is a set of state
linear time trends.
The coefficient of interest is β , which measures how having a gubernatorial election in a
state affects the probability that the state has an execution that year. The year dummies control
for national trends in executions that may be correlated with gubernatorial elections. The state
fixed effects control for any fixed state-specific omitted variables that may be correlated with the
propensity of states to hold executions, and the state trends control for linear changes over time
in the propensity of a state to perform executions that might be correlated with elections.
Therefore, β is identified by differences in execution behavior in states with and without a
gubernatorial election in a given year that are different than their linear trends.
We concentrate on the probability that a state has at least one execution in a given year,
rather than on the number of executions performed, for a couple of reasons. First, as discussed in
the Introduction, executions are rare in most states; the majority of death penalty states have
6

either no executions or one execution per year during the sample period. Table 3 presents a
tabulation of the frequency of executions for the 842 state/year observations in our sample. In a
large majority of state/year cells, there are no executions. For years in which states do hold
executions, more than half of the time they have only one execution. Thus, for most states, the
primary source of variation in their propensity to execute is based on whether they have any
executions in a given year.
Second, if there is an effect of elections on execution propensities, we would expect it to
be concentrated on the margin where the political benefit of holding an additional execution is
likely to be the largest. Because, from a political perspective, there are probably diminishing
returns to conducting executions, it seems likely that the marginal benefit of performing an
execution would be largest in states where executions are uncommon. In states that rarely
execute, an additional execution often attracts substantial press coverage; whereas in states
where executions are commonplace, an extra execution typically generates little coverage. As a
result, if there is an election cycle in state executions, we would expect it to be most pronounced
along the zero-one margin. Later, we will also estimate a count model that restricts the marginal
effect of an election to be constant and independent of the number of executions conducted.
The estimates from the probit model are presented in Table 4, using our sample of
executions from 1977 to 2000. Column (1) displays the results of the estimation of Equation (1).
The coefficient on the election indicator is positive and statistically different from zero. The
estimated marginal probability suggests that a gubernatorial election increases the probability of
a state execution by slightly less than 6 percentage points. Evaluated at the mean execution
probability observed in our sample, this estimate indicates that states are about 25 percent more
likely to perform an execution in an election year than in other years.
We are concerned that the state linear trends might not be adequately controlling for
time-varying omitted variables that are correlated with elections and the probability that a state
7

holds an execution. Therefore, we investigate the robustness of our results to two alternative
specifications. In Column (2), we add division × year interactions to the model presented in
Equation (1). The divisions are the nine Census divisions of the United States.7 Adding these
interactions controls for any division-level time-varying omitted variables that are correlated
with the likelihood that a state performs an execution. The coefficient on the election indicator is
again positive and statistically different from zero. The marginal effect of an election is slightly
bigger than the estimate in Column (1), but an election still increases the probability of an
execution by about 25 percent.8
We add governor fixed effects to the model presented in Equation (1); these are dummy
variables for each individual who served as governor in a state over the sample period. The
results are presented in Column (3) of Table 4. The coefficient on gubernatorial elections is
identified in this specification by examining whether the propensity to perform executions varies
across election and non-election years within each individual governor’s tenure in office.9 The
estimate of the effect of an election using this model is again slightly larger than our previous
estimates and still statistically different from zero. The marginal effect of an election in this
model implies an increase in the probability of an execution of slightly less than 7 percentage
points, which represents more than a 25 percent increase over the baseline execution probability.
Finally, we add additional control variables to the specification that includes governor
fixed effects. In Column (4), we include two measures of state economic performance: the state
unemployment rate and state per capita income. The addition of these variables does not change
the effect of gubernatorial elections on execution probabilities. In Column (5), we add measures
of the state death row population at the beginning of each year. The first variable is the number
of people on death row in the state and the second is the percentage of the death row population
that is white. These additional controls also have little effect on our parameter estimates. We
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have also included all of these state-level controls in our subsequent models; again, they do not
affect our estimates of interest. For brevity, we do not report these results.
Given our finding that elections increase the probability of an execution in a state, we
next examine whether the effect of an election on the likelihood of a state execution varies by the
race of the defendant. We re-estimate Equation (1) with two separate dependent variables: the
first is an indicator for whether a state executes at least one white defendant in a given year and
the second is an indicator for whether a state executes at least one African American defendant in
a given year. These results are presented in Table 5. Columns (1) through (3) present the results
for the executions of white defendants using: in Column (1), our basic probit model with statespecific trends; in Column (2), division × year effects; and in Column (3), governor fixed effects.
In all specifications, the effect of gubernatorial elections is positive but small and not statistically
different from zero; a gubernatorial election only increases the probability that a state executes a
white defendant by between 7 percent (Column (1)) and 13 percent (Column (2)).
On the other hand, as shown in Columns (4) through (6), there is a large effect of
elections on the probability that a state executes an African American in all specifications. The
effect of a gubernatorial election is positive, large and statistically different from zero in all
specifications, implying that a gubernatorial election increases the chance there is at least one
execution of an African American defendant by between 29 percent (Column (6)) and 37 percent
(Column (5)).10 In the literature on sentencing, it is often noted that attempts to determine the
pure effect of race on the receipt of the death penalty are confounded by the fact that African
Americans are more likely to be involved in murders with aggravating circumstances (Langbein
1999). To investigate this possibility, we estimated the same probit models as were used for
black defendants, but changed the dependent variable to the probability that the state executes at
least one defendant who was involved in a multi-victim homicide in a given year. The election
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coefficients from these models were two to three times smaller than the coefficients from the
corresponding models for black defendants and were not statistically different from zero.
There are also differences in the effect of gubernatorial elections on executions by region
of the country. We divide the United States into the South and the rest of the country and
estimate a probit model that allows the effect of gubernatorial elections to vary across these
regions.11 The model specification is:
Pr (Execution i ,t ) = Φ (α + β 1 Election Indicator i ,t + β 2 Electioni ,t × South Indicatori +ϕ t +γ i+η i ,t ) (2)

where j indexes regions. Southi is an indicator that state i is in the South, and the other variables
are defined as before.12 β 2 is the coefficient of interest, which measures whether the effect of
gubernatorial elections on execution probabilities is different in the South than the rest of the
United States.13 The results of this estimation are displayed in Table 6. Column (1) presents the
basic estimates, Column (2) adds division × year effects to the regression specification, and
Column (3) adds governor effects. All specifications produce similar patterns in the coefficients
on the direct election effect and the interaction term, suggesting that the positive effect of
gubernatorial elections on the probability of executions is concentrated in states in the South.
Using a similar methodology, we also examine whether there are differences in the effect
of gubernatorial elections on executions based on the party affiliation of the governor. The model
specification is:
Pr (Execution i ,t ) = Φ (α + β 1Election i ,t + β 2GOP Governor i ,t + β 3Election i ,t ×GOP i ,t +ϕ t +γ i+η i ,t ) (3)

where GOP Governor i ,t is an indicator that the sitting governor in the state is a Republican, and
the other variables are defined as above. β 3 is the coefficient of interest, which measures
whether the effect of elections on executions is different in states with a Republican governor
than in states with other governors. The results are presented in Table 7. For all three sets of
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controls, we find little difference in the effect of elections for states with Republican governors
compared to other states.14
Our final cut of the data is to examine whether the effect of elections on the probability of
executions differs for states with gubernatorial term limits compared to other states. In a state in
which an administration can only be reelected a limited number of times, there might be less of
an incentive to manipulate executions. Our model specification is:
Pr (Execution i ,t ) = Φ (α + β 1Election i ,t + β 2Term Limit i ,t + β 3Election i ,t ×Term Limit i ,t +ϕ t +γ i+η i ,t ) (4)

where Term Limit i ,t is an indicator that state i has a gubernatorial term limit in year t, and the
other variables are defined as before.15 The coefficient on the interaction term measures whether
elections have a different effect in states with term limits than other states. Table 8 displays the
estimates of Equation (4). In all three specifications, the effect of elections in states with term
limits is smaller than in other states. In the specifications with state time trends (Column (1)) and
governor fixed effects (Column (3)), the difference is statistically significant at conventional
levels. 16

4. Additional Evidence
Instead of estimating how gubernatorial elections affect the likelihood that a state holds
an execution, we can also measure how elections affect the number of executions held in a state
in a given year. To do this, we estimate a count model in which the independent variables are the
same as in our probit models, but the dependent variable is the number of executions that a state
holds in a year.
Results for three negative binomial regressions are presented in Table 9. The coefficient
on the indicator for a gubernatorial election in Column (1) is positive but imprecisely estimated.
The implied marginal effect of a gubernatorial election is about 0.17 additional executions in a
state, an increase of about 20 percent. In Column (2), division × year effects are again added to
11

the model specification. The effect of elections is again positive and now statistically different
from zero at the 10 percent significance level. The calculated marginal effect implies that an
election increases the number of executions in a state by about 30 percent. Finally, in Column (3)
we add the governor effects. The coefficient on gubernatorial elections is similar to the previous
specification and is statistically different from zero.17
One drawback of using a count model is that it constrains the estimated marginal effect of
an election on the likelihood a state has an extra execution to be constant, no matter how many
executions a state has in a given year. As discussed above, we expect the effect of elections to be
more important in states that typically have few executions and to be less of a factor in high
execution states. This may explain why our count model results are weaker than the estimates
from our probit models.
As a sensitivity check on our probit models, we estimated a multinomial logit model to
examine the effect of gubernatorial elections on the transitions of all death row inmates out of
death row. The sample includes every death row inmate each year he is on death row, using the
data set from the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Four outcomes can occur during the year. The
inmate could either continue to stay on death row or leave death row because he was executed,
died for other reasons, or his sentence was overturned.18 Table 10 shows the annual probability
of these transitions in our data set. In our multinomial logit model, the probability of outcome j
occurring is given by:
pj =

exp(X 'β
D

j

)

, j=1,2,…m-1

(5)

and

pm =

1
D

where
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D = 1 + ∑ exp(X 'β
m −1
j =1

j

),

(j=1,2,…m) are the different outcomes that can occur to a death row inmate in a year, p j is the
probability that outcome j occurs, X is a vector of characteristics, and β

j

is the vector of

coefficients pertaining to outcome j.
As with a simple bivariate logit model, the coefficients in a multinomial logit are
estimated only up to a scale factor, while the coefficients for the reference choice ( β m , staying
on death row in this application) are set equal to zero. The explanatory variables included in the
model are an indicator for whether there is a gubernatorial election in the state the year of the
observation, various demographic characteristics of the inmate (dummies for race, sex, marital
status, education and time on death row), and our standard set of state and year effects and state
linear trends. As with the count models, this model does not allow for different effects of
elections on the movement of prisoners off death row based on the number of executions that
have occurred in the state.
The results of this estimation are presented in Table 11. We are most interested in two
transitions out of death row: executions and overturned sentences. Therefore, the coefficients we
present measure the effect of gubernatorial elections on the probability that a defendant is
executed instead of remaining on death row and the probability that a defendant has his sentence
changed instead of remaining on death row.
Columns (1) through (3) present the estimates of the execution transition. The first
Column shows the results of our basic model; the effect of a gubernatorial election is positive
and statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level of significance.19 The implied increase
in the probability of an execution in an election year is approximately 0.38 percentage points, or
about a 30 percent increase relative to the baseline probability. In Column (2), we add
division × year effects to the model specification. Again there is a positive estimated effect of
13

elections on the probability an inmate is executed, and the estimate is statistically different from
zero. The implied increase in the probability that a defendant is executed in an election year is
about 50 percent in this specification. Finally, in Column (3), we add governor effects; the
coefficient on the election indicator is similar to the previous specifications, but the standard
error is very large and the effect is not statistically different from zero. Columns (4) through (6)
present the estimates of the sentence change transition. In all specifications, the effect of an
election year is small and not statistically different from zero.
In an effort to better understand the source of the election cycle in executions, we
examine whether changes in commutations can explain the increase in executions during election
years. Using the Bureau of Justice Statistics data on all death row inmates, we calculate the
number of commutations performed in each state each year. We then estimate whether states are
more or less likely to commute death sentences during election years than other years. The probit
specification we use is identical to Equation (1), except that the dependent variable is an
indicator for whether the state commutes a death sentence in a given year. Results of this
estimation are reported in Table 12. Using our usual sets of controls, we find no evidence that
states are more or less likely to commute death sentences during election years.20 Therefore, it
does not appear that the election cycle in executions is being driven by changes in commutation
behavior.21

5. Issues Related to Timing
In this section, we explore the temporal process that leads to additional executions in
election years relative to non-election years. We study whether the election cycle in state
executions is generated by, on average, moving executions up in time or holding them back. This
distinction is of interest because the latter scenario would not appear to compromise the due
process rights of death row inmates while the former scenario might. As discussed below, the
data do not permit us to directly test whether the additional executions held in election years
14

represent “extra” executions that would not have occurred otherwise, or whether they instead
reflect substitutions over time from among a fixed stock of executions. Of course, these two
possibilities are not mutually exclusive.
We investigate whether defendants executed during election years stayed on death row
for shorter periods of time than defendants executed in other years using information on all
persons on death row between 1973 to 1999. For each year that a state has at least one execution,
we calculate the average time the people executed in that state were on death row. By “time on
death row,” we mean the number of months between the date that the defendant was first
sentenced to death and the date that he was executed. Note that there are only 199 state/year cells
between 1977 and 1999 with at least one execution; thus, the precision of our estimates is limited
by the small size of the sample. The regression specification is:
ln( Average Time on Death Row i ,t ) = α + βElection Indicator i ,t +ϕ t +γ i+η i ,t +ε i ,t

(6)

where Average Time on Death Row i ,t is the average number of months that defendants who were
executed in state i in year t waited on death row, and the other variables are defined as before.
The results of the OLS regressions of Equation (6) are presented in Table 13. The
coefficient on the election indicator is negative and statistically different from zero in Column
(1), suggesting that defendants executed during election years spent about 19 percent (exp(.1777) – 1) less time on death row than people executed in other years. Given an average stay on
death row of approximately ten years, this implies that inmates executed during election years
have their stays shortened by slightly less than two years on average. In Column (2),
division × year effects are added to the specification; the coefficient becomes smaller in absolute
value and is not statistically different from zero. By this estimate, a defendant executed during an
election year has about a 9 percent shorter spell on death row (approximately 11 months) than
other defendants who are executed. The final Column adds the governor effects. The coefficient
implies that inmates executed during election years had about a 14 percent shorter stay on death
15

row (approximately 17 months) than other executed defendants, but the standard error is too
large for this effect to be statistically different from zero.
Given that inmates who are executed during election years appear to spend less time on
death row than other inmates, a natural question to ask is whether the increased executions
during election years represent “extra” executions, or whether they would have occurred at a
later date anyway. This is a difficult question because the evidence we have generated does not
allow us to discriminate among these two possibilities. To definitively distinguish between the
two scenarios, one would need to know the counterfactual of how states would behave in the
absence of an election cycle. But because all states have election cycles, and have them all the
time, it is impossible to know this counterfactual. Sorting out the exact mechanisms through
which election cycles in executions are implemented does not appear to be possible with our
data, but remains an important area for future research.22

6. Conclusion
Our analysis indicates that holding other factors constant, states are approximately 25
percent more likely to conduct executions in gubernatorial election years than in other years.
Moreover, elections have a larger effect on the probability that an African American defendant
will be executed in a given year than on the probability that a white defendant will be executed.
We also find evidence that the total number of executions performed is higher in election years,
that the relationship between elections and executions is strongest in the South, and that
gubernatorial term limits weaken the impact of elections on executions. Further, we find some
evidence that the existence of politically-timed executions reduces the average time that executed
defendants spend on death row, suggesting that the increased executions observed in election
years may result from an acceleration of the process by which inmates are selected for execution.
Taken together, our results indicate that election year political considerations influence
both the timing and racial composition of executions, a finding which seems in conflict with the
16

Supreme Court’s requirement that states administer the death penalty in a consistent and
nondiscriminatory manner. Although not a legal analysis, this work does point to the need for
further research on how death sentences are carried out by state governments.
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1.

For conflicting evidence on the existence of racial disparities in the administration of the
Federal death penalty, see U.S. Department of Justice (2000) and U.S. Department of
Justice (2001).

2.

State and local elections have previously been shown to exert an independent influence
on other public policy decisions. Examples include the level of spending and taxation
within a state (Poterba 1994), police hiring by cities (Levitt 1997), and changes in state
excise taxes on cigarettes and beer (Kubik and Moran 2001).

3.

Unfortunately, the data do not permit us to determine the extent to which the additional
executions performed in election years represent a net increase in the number of
executions conducted, or whether they are brought about purely through a reallocation of
executions that would have taken place anyway. We discuss this issue in more depth in
Section 5.

4.

Pridemore’s result is consistent with states increasing executions and decreasing
commutations in election years. But it is also consistent with states increasing only
executions, or holding the number of executions constant and decreasing commutations.
Alternatively, states might decrease both executions and commutations during election
years, but decrease commutations by more than executions. Or, states might increase both
executions and commutations, but increase executions more.

5.

These restrictions result in a data set with 842 state/year cells.

6.

There are 199 state/year cells with at least one execution between 1977 and 1999.

7.

They are: New England (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT), Middle Atlantic (NJ, NY, PA), East
North Central (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI), West North Central (IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND,
SD), South Atlantic (DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV), East South Central (AL, KY,
MS, TN), West South Central (AR, LA, OK, TX), Mountain (AZ, CO, ID, MT, NE, NM,
UT, WY) and Pacific (AK, CA, HI, OR, WA).

8.

We have also estimated all of our probit models using logit and linear probability models
and obtain similar estimates of the marginal effects using these other models.

9.

Including a fixed effect for each governor is akin to allowing for different period effects
by state, where the periods are defined by the years that each governor held office. We
also include year dummies to capture trends arising at the national level.

10.

In contrast to many of the studies on racial disparities in sentencing (see, for example,
Gross and Mauro 1984; Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski 1990; and Glaeser and
Sacerdote 2000), we did not find evidence of disparate treatment based on the race of the
victim. One possible reason for this is the potentially different motivations that arise at
the sentencing and punishment stages. At the time of sentencing, there is a substantial
18

focus on the victims of the crime; however, by the time an inmate is scheduled to be
executed, news accounts typically focus on the race of the inmate rather than the victim.
11.

The South is defined as states in the three Census divisions that make up the South census
region. They are the South Atlantic, the East South Central, and the West South Central
divisions.

12.

Similar results are obtained if the effect of elections is allowed to vary across the four
Census regions.

13.

The direct effect of a state being located in the South is subsumed in the state effects.

14.

We have also estimated this model using a specification that allows for a different effect
of elections if the governor is a Republican, Democrat or independent. Again, we find
little difference in the effect of elections across these states.

15.

Data on gubernatorial term limits come from various editions of the Almanac of
American Politics (Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews).

16.

We have also attempted to examine whether the election effect varies based on the
closeness of the gubernatorial election. Using data on election outcomes from the
Almanac of American Politics (Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews), we found a small but
statistically insignificant increase in the probability of an execution in years with a close
election. A problem with this methodology, of course, is that whether an election is close
or not might depend on whether there are executions in the state that year. Polling data on
the popularity of the incumbent governor (sufficiently far in advance of the election to
permit a reaction by the governor) would be a better measure, but consistent polling
information across states and over time is not readily available.

17.

The count models in Table 9, as well as the probit models in Tables 4 and 5, were also
estimated using data for the pre-Furman era from the publication, Executions in the
United States, 1608-1991: The ESPY File (Espy and Smykla 1994). For the period 1935
to 1968, we failed to find any large or significant effect of elections on either the
probability of conducting an execution (either in general, or broken down by race), or on
the number of executions performed. This result is perhaps not surprising in light of the
fact that executions were very common during this period, implying that the marginal
political benefit from holding an additional execution was probably negligible.

18.

A death sentence can be overturned because a court has declared the death penalty
unconstitutional, because the conviction of a defendant was confirmed by a court but the
death sentence was reversed, because both the conviction and sentence were overturned,
or because there was a commutation of the death sentence.

19.

Because the election indicator only varies at the state level, we adjust the standard errors
to take into account the within-state correlation of the observations.

20.

We find similar null results when using a count model to estimate the effect of
gubernatorial elections on the number of commutations.

21.

This suggests that the election cycle in commutations per execution found by Pridemore
is due to changes in executions rather than commutations. Another possibility is that the
election cycles we observe are based on judicial, rather than gubernatorial, elections. To
investigate this possibility, we gathered data on the timing of elections to each state’s
19

Supreme Court from www.faircourts.org for the death penalty states in our sample. An
examination of these data reveal little overlap in when state Supreme Court justices are
elected, making it difficult to distinguish between “election” and “non-election” years.
The majority of death penalty states have between five and nine Supreme Court justices,
with seven being the modal number. It is rare for half or more of a state’s Supreme Court
justices to be up for election in the same year. Typically, only one or two justices are
running for election in a given year. Moreover, seven of the death penalty states do not
select Supreme Court justices through popular elections. Based on these observations, we
believe it is unlikely that a judicial election cycle is the source of our findings.
22.

We have shown that the cycle is not attributable to a greater reluctance to issue
commutations in election years. Another possibility, but one which we cannot investigate
with our data, is that governors, or clemency boards, simply “stay” fewer executions in
election years than in other years. These stays, which are temporary in nature, would lead
to both an election cycle in executions and shorter death row spells for inmates executed
in election years (who, under this theory, would be less likely to receive a stay). This
theory offers a somewhat attractive explanation for the cycle because it does not require
collusion between governors (or their representatives) and members of either the judicial
or criminal justice systems. Nonetheless, it would still have important implications for the
due process rights of prisoners, since those not receiving stays would be executed more
quickly and would also have less time to gather potentially exculpatory evidence. It
would also suggest, based on our earlier findings, that the likelihood of receiving a stay is
a function of the defendant’s race, at least in election years.
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Table 1. Number of Executions by State: 1977-2000
State
AL

Year Death
Penalty Reinstated
1976

AK

No Death Penalty

AZ

1973

AR

Number of
Executions
23

State
MT

Year Death
Penalty Reinstated
1974

Number of
Executions
2

NC

1977

16

22

ND

No Death Penalty

1973

23

NE

1973

3

CA

1978

8

NV

1973

8

CO

1975

1

NH

1991

0

CT

1973

0

NJ

1982

0

DE

1974

11

NM

1979

0

FL

1972

50

NY

1995

0

GA

1973

23

OH

1974

1

HI

No Death Penalty

OK

1973

30

ID

1973

1

OR

1978

2

IL

1974

12

PA

1974

3

IN

1973

7

RI

No Death Penalty

IA

No Death Penalty

SC

1974

25

KS

1994

0

SD

1979

0

KY

1975

2

TN

1974

1

LA

1973

26

TX

1974

239

ME

No Death Penalty

UT

1973

6

MD

1975

VT

No Death Penalty

MA

No Death Penalty

VA

1975

81

MI

No Death Penalty

WA

1975

3

MN

No Death Penalty

WV

No Death Penalty

MS

1974

WI

No Death Penalty

3

4

MO
1975
46
WY
1977
1
Notes: The number of executions is cumulative executions in a state, either after 1976 or after the state adopted the death
penalty.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Yearly Executions by State: 1977-2000

Indicator that State Had Execution in Year
Number of Executions in Year
Indictor that State Executed White Defendant

Mean
(1)
0.2530

Minimum
(2)

Maximum
(3)

0.8111
[2.937]

0

40

0

21

0

16

0.1876

Number of White Executions

0.4489
[1.583]

Indicator that State Executed African-American Defendant
Number of African-American Executions

0.1390
0.2898
[1.113]

Average Months on Death Row of Defendants Executed in Year

119.6
3
242
[51.77]
Notes: The sample includes states that have a death penalty between 1977 and 2000. Standard deviations are in
brackets. There are 842 state/year observations.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 3. Tablulation of Number of Executions in a State in a Year: 1977-2000
Number of Executions
0

Frequency
629

Percentage
74.7

Cumulative Percentage
74.7

1

111

13.2

87.9

2

35

4.2

92.0

3

16

1.9

94.0

4

15

1.8

95.8

5

8

1.0

96.7

6

8

1.0

97.6

7

2

0.2

97.2

8

4

0.5

98.3

9

2

0.2

98.6

10

1

0.1

98.7

11

1

0.1

98.8

12

1

0.1

98.9

13

1

0.1

99.0

14

2

0.2

99.1

17

1

0.1

99.3

19

1

0.1

99.4

20

1

0.1

99.5

35

1

0.1

99.6

37

1

0.1

99.8

40
1
0.1
100.0
Notes: This is a tablulation of the number of executions in each of the 842 state/year observations.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 4. The Effect of Gubernatorial Elections
on Whether a State Has an Execution during the Year
(1)
0.4507
(0.1868)
[0.0588]

(2)
0.6701
(0.2462)
[0.0670]

(3)
0.5718
(0.2063)
[0.0681]

State Effects

Yes

Yes

---

Year Effects

Yes

---

Yes

State Linear Trends

Yes

No

No

Year × Division Effects

No

Yes

No

Indicator for Gubernatorial Election

Governor Effects
No
No
Yes
Notes: The coefficients are from probit models where the dependent variable is an indicator for
whether a state has an execution during the year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Average
marginal effects are in brackets. There are 842 observations.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 5. The Effect of Gubernatorial Elections on
Whether a State Has an Execution during the Year by Race
(1)
0.1002
(0.1804)
[0.0132]

Whites
(2)
0.2334
(0.2185)
[0.0253]

(3)
0.1257
(0.2022)
[0.0158]

(4)
0.6502
(0.2606)
[0.0442]

State Effects

Yes

Yes

---

Yes

Yes

---

Year Effects

Yes

---

Yes

Yes

---

Yes

State Linear Trends

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Year × Division Effects

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Indicator for Gubernatorial Election

African-Americans
(5)
(6)
0.8526
0.6740
(0.2828)
(0.2887)
[0.0512]
[0.0403]

Governor Effects
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Notes: The coefficients are from probit models where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether a state has an execution during the year.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Average marginal effects are in brackets. There are 842 observations.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 6. The Effect of Gubernatorial Elections
on Whether a State Has an Execution by Region
(1)
-0.0095
(0.0354)

(2)
0.0000
(.0249)

(3)
-0.0262
(0.0399)

Election × Indicator for North Central

0.0633
(0.0602)

0.0641
(0.0834)

0.0762
(0.0639)

Election × Indicator for South

0.1201
(0.0490)

0.1321
(0.0564)

0.1472
(0.0486)

Election × Indicator for West

-0.0057
(0.0522)

-0.0434
(0.0726)

-0.0117
(0.0527)

State Effects

Yes

Yes

---

Year Effects

Yes

---

Yes

State Linear Trends

Yes

No

No

Year × Division Effects

No

Yes

No

Election × Indicator for Northeast

Governor Effects
No
No
Yes
Notes: The coefficients are from OLS regression models where the dependent variable is an indicator for
whether a state has an execution during the year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. There are 842
observations.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 7. The Effect of Gubernatorial Elections
on Whether a State Has an Execution by the Governor’s Party Affiliation
(1)
0.0670
(0.0419)

(2)
0.0630
(0.0464)

(3)
0.0806
(0.0418)

Indicator for Republican Governor

-0.0340
(0.0331)

-0.0373
(0.0389)

---

Election × Indicator for Republican

-0.0076
(0.0544)

0.0022
(0.0703)

-0.0076
(0.0562)

State Effects

Yes

Yes

---

Year Effects

Yes

---

Yes

State Linear Trends

Yes

No

No

Year × Division Effects

No

Yes

No

Election Indicator

Governor Effects
No
No
Yes
Notes: The coefficients are from OLS regression models where the dependent variable is an indicator for
whether a state has an execution during the year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. There are 842
observations.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 8. The Effect of Gubernatorial Elections
on Whether a State Has an Execution by Whether a State has Term Limit
(1)
1.087
(.4319)
[.1231]

(2)
1.081
(.5282)
[.0916]

(3)
1.438
(.4280)
[.1436]

Indicator for Term Limit

-.0665
(.6687)
[-.0074]

.5452
(.4983)
[.0447]

.2181
(.4854)
[.0223]

Election × Indicator for Term Limit

-.7889
(.4562)
[-.0775]

-.4925
(.5837)
[-.0386]

-1.048
(.4554)
[-.0917]

State Effects

Yes

Yes

---

Year Effects

Yes

---

Yes

State Linear Trends

Yes

No

No

Year × Division Effects

No

Yes

No

Election Indicator

Governor Effects
No
No
Yes
Notes: The coefficients are from probit models where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether a state
has an execution during the year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Average marginal effects are in
brackets. There are 842 observations.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 9. The Effect of Gubernatorial
Elections on the Number of Executions in a State
(1)
0.1960
(0.1292)
[0.1681]

(2)
0.2868
(0.1737)
[0.2535]

(3)
0.2569
(0.1279)
[0.2237]

State Effects

Yes

Yes

---

Year Effects

Yes

---

Yes

State Linear Trends

Yes

No

No

Year × Division Effects

No

Yes

No

Indicator for Gubernatorial Election

Governor Effects
No
No
Yes
Notes: The coefficients are from negative binomial models where the dependent variable is the number of
executions in a state during the year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Average marginal effects are
in brackets. There are 842 observations.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 10. Sample Probabilities That
Inmates Leave Death Row in a Year
Yearly Sample Probability
0.0126

Inmate executed
Inmate dies because of other reason

0.0042

Inmate’s death sentence is overturned
0.0362
Notes: Tabulations of outcomes of all inmates on death row between 1977 and 1999.
42,239 inmate/year cells.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 11. The Effect of Gubernatorial Elections on the Transitions of Death Row Inmates
(1)
0.2818
(0.1745)
[0.0038]

Execution Transition
(2)
0.4016
(0.1345)
[0.0054]

(3)
0.2172
(0.4243)
[0.0029]

State Effects

Yes

Yes

---

Yes

Yes

---

Year Effects

Yes

---

Yes

Yes

---

Yes

State Linear Trends

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Year × Division Effects

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Indicator for Gubernatorial Election

Death Sentence Overturned Transition
(4)
(5)
(6)
-0.0753
0.0864
-0.0212
(0.1153)
(0.4599)
(0.1591)
[-0.0026]
[0.0027]
[-0.0008]

Governor Effects
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Notes: The estimates are from a multinomial logit model. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are adjusted to take into account the correlation
of observations within states. Specification also includes dummies for race, marital status, sex and time on death row. Average marginal effects are in
brackets. There are 42,239 observations.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 12. The Effect of Gubernatorial Elections on
Whether a State Commutes a Death Sentence during the Year
(1)
.2728
(.2660)
[.0200]

(2)
.0674
(.3219)
[.0035]

(3)
-.0608
(.3648)
[-.0032]

State Effects

Yes

Yes

---

Year Effects

Yes

---

Yes

State Linear Trends

Yes

No

No

Year × Division Effects

No

Yes

No

Indicator for Gubernatorial Election

Governor Effects
No
No
Yes
Notes: The coefficients are from probit models where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether a state
commutes a death sentence during the year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Average marginal
effects are in brackets. There are 842 observations.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 13. The Effect of Gubernatorial Elections on
the Amount of Time a Person Executed Is on Death Row
(1)
-.1777
(.0902)

(2)
-.0885
(.1407)

(3)
-.1288
(.0806)

State Effects

Yes

Yes

---

Year Effects

Yes

---

Yes

State Linear Trends

Yes

No

No

Year × Division Effects

No

Yes

No

Indicator for Gubernatorial Election

Governor Effects
No
No
Yes
Notes: The coefficients are from OLS regression models where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the
average time the people executed in a state during the year spent on death row. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. There are 199 observations.
Source: Authors’ calulations.
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Figure 1. Number of Executions per Year: 1977-2000
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Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 2. Number of States with Death Penalty:
1977-2000
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Figure 3. The Percentage of States with Death
Penalty That Have an Execution in Year: 19772000
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